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Abstract: 
 
The configuration of the cold war determines institutional quality. Countries 
pertaining to the block of the West display a negative link with bureaucratic 
development, lack of corruption, credibility of governments and others. Results are 
maintained even after controlling for regional and colonial variables and, in 
general, appear robust. In addition, the memberships of blocks according to the 
configuration of the cold war can thus be used like relevant instruments for the 
institutional variables. 
 
 
  
                                                          
1
 We would like to thank Martin Kabange for lectures. 
2 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
In spite of the extensive literature developed over the past 20yrs, the quest for finding the 
determinants of Institutional quality has not waned  (e.g. Chong and Zanforlin, 2000 ; Islam 
and Montenegro, 2002 ; Alonso and Garcimartín, 2013 ;Kanyama-Kalonda and Kodila-
Tedika, 2013 ; Mijiyawa, 2013 ; Tcheta-Bampa and Kodila-Tedika, 2014a). Current study 
that is imposed in this list of determinants is that the theory of institutional differences is due 
to historical factors. The theory is that the quality of institutions is a consequence of historical 
events. In other words, historical events at a specific moment of time, determine the nature of 
the institutions, and they persist over time by generating different effects (e.g. Engerman et 
Sokoloff, 1997, 2002 ; Sokoloff et Engermann, 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson et Robinson, 2001 
et 2002 ; Nunn, 2012). 
This study is a continuation of this piece of literature. As Tcheta-Bampa and Kodila-Tedika 
(2014b), we believe that the Cold War is a significant determinant of institutions. These 
authors have shown that political instability related to the Cold War blocked the process of 
institutional change in course after independence, particularly for the duration of the power of 
African leaders. Econometric results, based on African data, establish negative and significant 
stability between the executive and support of the superpowers to political regimes (taken as a 
whole) relations. Separately, we find that African leaders supported by the United States and 
its allies cumulatively run a greater risk of leaving power than leaders of African countries 
supported by the USSR. In this research, we push this argument further: we assume that the 
configuration of the Cold War has maintained a sort of institutional status quo. More simply, 
it has developed a kind of institutional club: countries with developed beneficial institutions 
pro- market development (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1995; Chong and Calderon, 2000; Henisz, 
2000; Easterly and Ross, 2003; Durham, 2004; Rodrik et al., 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2005 ; 
Tebaldi and Mohan, 2010), are those with highly rated institutions in the conventional 
indicators . In interrogative words, we try to answer the following questions: Does the Cold 
War affects contemporary or current institutions? Why is there a difference in the quality of 
institutions depending on the role one played during the Cold War ? i.e. if one was a major or 
a neutral player? Has the West Block well noted in the usual indicators compared to the 
Eastern bloc institutions? 
The rest of the article is organised as follows: Section II discusses conceptual framework 
linking Cold War to institutions. The next section describes the data. The fourth section 
introduces the empirical model and discusses the controls used. Five section reports the 
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correlation between key variables and presents the econometric results. Regardless of the 
institutional data used, there are reasons to believe that the effect of the Cold War on 
institutional quality is undeniable. In particular, countries pertaining to the block of the West 
appear to have bad institutions. Finally, Section 6 provides a brief summary and concludes. 
2 IMPORTANCE OF COLD WAR  
A recent literature is organized around progressive effects of the Cold War on both 
macroeconomic variables and institutions. Tcheta-Bampa (2009) develops a model of 
endogenous political choice where public investment, diversification of the economy, 
improving the potential overall economic performance equip civil society with a power that is 
beyond the control of political elites and can cause either the loss of their scheme is a 
modification of their survival strategy. As part of this model of endogenous institutional 
change, the effect of the Cold War is then introduced. This shows that the national balance in 
developing countries are not independent of the support of world powers and their ability to 
encourage the masses to challenge and / or support the power. Berger et al. (2013) highlight 
the consequences of the intervention of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the context 
of the Cold War. These scholars show that the country’s imports from USA were boosted by 
these interventions. In an institutional registry Tcheta-Bampa and Kodila-Tedika (2014) 
explained empirically the duration of dictatorial political regimes by the patronage of the Cold 
War. 
This research is based more on the study. In fact, it is an extension. The hypothesis of the 
study is simple: the cold war affects contemporary institutions. This is possible via several 
channels. This war is a direct confrontation between two superpowers that emerged from the 
Second World War, which opposes all. From an ideological point of view, the United States, 
with its traditional allies (Western Europe) believe the ideas of democracy and freedom, while 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies based their ideas on a 
communist state to Marxism-Leninism. These ideas are reflected in the background of the 
system underlying the different countries or simply informal institutions as formal in this 
country. It is therefore not a surprise that the Western bloc was defeated on a political regime 
of liberal democracy, economically defending the free market economy. On the other hand, 
this country practices the totalitarian communist regime étatisant factors of production; 
highlighting bureaucratic centralization is a practice. This is akin to the USSR bloc. If these 
countries have taken such a direction, it is plausible to consider that the period of the Cold 
War deeply embedded in their mental scheme but also those countries that organizational 
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system. Institutions change never really bonded during this period thus, it is logical that the 
nuclei of the Western bloc may have an advantage in terms of ranking on the pro-market 
institutions and that there is a kind of resistance to these institutions in the other bloc, which 
the rest remained very compact, as the basis for most nation of the USSR. 
Meanwhile, there is another group of non-aligned countries. These are countries that have 
refused to take a stand. Demonstrated in the case where market institutions are those that 
promote development, one might think that the fact that the non-aligned countries mostly poor 
have not had time to set up a favorable institutional basis progress. However, history supports 
this reading. Indeed, most of these countries are poor countries or colonies directly attached to 
predatory nations. It is logical that the effect assumed to belong to this blog does not benefit 
necessarily today. 
At independence, the change of beneficiary extractive institutions has resulted in conflict 
between winners and losers of institutional change. The elites of newly independent countries, 
especially in Africa, have the same incentives as the colonizers to maintain mining institutions 
to maintain power in this conflict environment. This situation has been exacerbated by the 
ideological confrontation between the two superpowers. They had the opportunity to 
orchestrate coups to create "unbreakable" alliance with the new leadership. Thus, the non-
aligned bloc crumbled gradually inflating the other two blocks. However, institutional 
transplant has not necessarily been related. Because it is that is issues is not just ideological 
expansion itself, but first make sure to stop the extension of the other superpower. Whatever 
we cannot deny the fact that some countries have clearly their part: thus, for example, China 
ranks towards the USSR. This is also the case for other African countries that have benefited 
from Russian support: Angola, Mozambique, etc.  
At the national level, sponsorship generally easier for governments implementing policies 
economically inefficient but that transfer resources to the population elites, at the same time 
ensuring their political survival. The connection between the failed policies becomes useful to 
create an environment in which all group became politically mobilized against the leaders, 
could be punished while those who remained faithful could be rewarded. These failed policies 
have not enabled the progress of these countries. However, studies continue to show a link 
between progress - measured here in terms of a significant per capita GDP and quality 
education - and demand for quality institutions. In doing so, policy entrepreneurs have 
therefore not increased the ability of citizens to organize in a collective, essential for 
institutional improvement action. The patron of the powerful states schemes of the said States 
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" non-aligned " discourages the formation of an effective opposition to the governing force 
but could not also completely destroy the resistance plans. All incentives are now in place so 
that there is no real change in institutional terms. Almost all of these leaders, especially in 
Africa, have the same behavior. Taking advantage of the political economy during the 
confrontation between the world powers, elites have managed to sustain political regimes 
with weak institutions (our binding on) and apparently benefit to anyone outside of the 
smaller cliques. 
This political economy therefore results in several hypotheses that we test empirically: 
Hypothesis 1 : the cold war is a determinant of the institutional quality 
Hypothesis 2 : countries which constitute the western part of the world, need to have 
better established institutions, than those which constitute the Eastern part and the 
non-aligned countries. This hypothesis is presented through a positive coefficient for 
the countries of the west, whereas for the East and the non-aligned countries, a 
negative coefficient is displayed. 
Hypothesis 3 : the dynamic of the cold war should render the results of the Western 
countries and the non-aligned countries weaker. As highlighted, the continuous need 
to further investigate into this issue presents the problem   of not always succeeding in 
“institutional transplantation”. The diffusion can be biased. As such, the non-aligned 
countries have given more supply to Western countries than Eastern ones. 
Consequently, it is expected that given the vaster level of compactness of Eastern 
countries, an identical coefficient is predicted to that of the first estimations.  
3 DATA 
Two different sources of governance indicators are used for the analysis. These were chosen 
for the large number of data points that they offer. The first set of measures of institutional 
quality is compiled by Daniel Kaufmann, and Art Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi at the World 
Bank (www.govindicators.org). This data set aggregates indicators of six broad dimensions of 
governance: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. The six 
aggregate indicators are based on 30 underlying data sources reporting the perceptions of 
governance of a large number of survey respondents and expert assessments worldwide. This 
way of measuring institutions is current in empirical studies (Kodila-Tedika and Kanyama-
Kalonda, 2013 ; Islam and Montenegro,  2002) 
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Our second set of governance indicators come from the Heritage Foundation. We use the 
property right. It is that which Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (1998), La Porta et al. 
(1999) and, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) use in their studies. The data on GPD 
per capita comes from Pen World Tables, version 7.1 and education from Barro and Lee 
(2010). Reg refers to a regional dummy variable. If the country belongs to the region, it has a 
value of one, or else it is zero. Two sub regions are distinguished: sub Saharan Africa, and 
Latin America, as highlighted in Chong and Zanforlin (2000), Islam and Montenegro (2002). 
This variables allows the variation of governance to be controlled from one sub region to 
another. We distinguish between the English, French, Spanish and Other colony 
To appreciate the effects of the cold war, we consider data from Tcheta-Bampa and Kodila-
Tedika (2014a). From the geopolitics of the cold war, a binary variable that gives a score to 
each group of countries was constructed by these scholars.  These groups comprise three 
blocs: The western and eastern as well as the nonaligned countries. In light of  data  from 
legal origine de La Parto et al. (1999), it can be argued that if a country  belongs to the first 
group, for example, a score of 1 can be attributed, or else 0. A second variable was created by 
these scholars to consider the dynamic of the Cold War, which was fulfilled with the 
decolonization of countries. 
4 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
This study departs from Clague et al. (1996),La Porta et al. (1997), Chong and Zanforlin 
(2000). Our estimations use the following empirical model to test for the association between 
quality of institutions and cold war : 
                                                                 
Where institutional quality is the institutional quality variable, that is, either the World Bank 
Governance Indicator or the Heritage Foundation index;   is a constant, GDP is the GDP per 
capita in 2000, EDU is the average years of schooling of the population in2000, COLWAR is 
a bloc of cold war dummy variable (third possible dummies: Western bloc, Eastern bloc and 
Neutral bloc), REG is a regional or/and a colonial dummy, and  is the errorterm. 
According to the theory of “institutions efficiency”, income per head or economic growth 
influences the level of institutions. Empirical studies confirm this hypothesis (e.g. Clagueet 
al., 1996 ; Chong et Calderon, 2000a ; Kaufmann et Kraay, 2002 ; Keefer et Knack, 2002 ; 
Kalonda-Kanyama and Kodila-Tedika, 2013). To avoid issue related to non-orthogonally 
between institutions and the GDP per capica, some studies consider a GDP lagged, as long as 
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this variable is no longer considered as a variable of interest. Others studies on the other hand, 
use a current GDP (Potrafke, 2012; Kodila-Tedika, 2014).  The demand for best institutions 
evolves with the level of development. This requires an important cost which only developed 
countries can afford. The inclusion of education, is to be considered as well. Glaeser et al. 
(2004) confirm that current institutions firstly lay emphasis on human capital cumulation. 
Kodila-Tedika (2014) and Kalonda-Kanyama and Kodila-Tedika (2012) affirm that 
institutions are dependent on the intelligence of the population via apprenticeship and 
imitation. For the authors, intelligent people could try an institutional transplant considering 
informal local institutions. Botero et al. (2012) theoretically and empirically show that higher 
education leads to an exemplary behavior (i.e the ability to complain about bad practices), that 
which brings about responsibility and consequently leads to better institutions. Other 
empirical studies (Arezki et al., 2012; Rindermann and Kodila-Tedika, 2013), based on divers 
theoretical viewpoints, draw to the same conclusion. REG, represents a set of continental 
dummies (Latin America, Africa) and colonial dummies (British, Spanish, French, Others) 
« that have been included to make sure that the law tradition variable is not just picking up a 
regional effect, but an additional one. For example, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) argue that 
unlike other regions in the world, in the particular case of present day Latin America, the 
quality of institutions may be closely linked with the Spanish heritage of the region » (Chong 
and Zanforlin, 2002 : 1062). Finally, our variable of interest is cold war. It is to test our 
assumption. 
5 FINDING RESULTS 
The ordinary least squares results are presented in Table 1. Each of the columns (2)–(8) 
displays the estimated model for one of the seven institutional quality variables. The 
regression results show that cold war affects the institutional variables. We find that our first 
and second hypotheses are valid in general. Belonging to countries from the Eastern block 
and the non-aligned countries constitute a handicap. Our coefficient of interest,  , for East 
bloc is negative and significant at the 1% level in the regressions where the dependent 
variables is Control of Corruption, at the 5% level in the regressions where the dependent 
variables are Rule of Law and Property rights, ant at the 10% level in the regression where the 
dependent variables are is Government Effectiveness. However, the coefficients of dummy 
block eastern seem insignificant for variables Political Stability and Regulatory Quality. Also, 
our coefficient of interest,  , for Neutral bloc is negative and significant at the 1% level for all 
regressions. 
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Table 1. Main results 
 Dependant variable 
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Political 
Stability 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Control of 
Corruption 
Rule of 
Law 
Property 
rights 
Eastern bloc  -.369 
(0.071) 
-.089 
(0.666) 
-.135 
(0.496) 
-.158    
(0.473) 
-.510 
(0.002) 
-.438 
(0.050) 
-.884 
(0.012) 
Western bloc  .801    
(0.000) 
.364 
(0.098) 
.757    
(0.000) 
.793 
(0.000) 
.991 
(0.000) 
.866 
(0.000) 
1.242 
(0.001) 
Neutral bloc -.942 
(0.000) 
-.818 
(0.000) 
-.839 
(0.000) 
-.791 
(0.000) 
-.820 
(0.000) 
-.867 
(0.000) 
-1.247 
(0.000) 
Cons  .563    
(0.001) 
.299    
(0.033) 
.506    
(0.003) 
.405 
(0.012) 
.380 
(0.009) 
.426 
(0.018) 
6.033    
(0.000) 
Obs 139 139 139 139 186 139 122 
R-squared 0.3775 0.2465 0.3450 0.3340 0.3251 0.3566 0.3335 
. --- dropped variable for collinearity ; All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity 
correction. P-values are in parentheses. 
Countries of Western block have better results than those of eastern bloc. Our coefficient of 
interest,  , for Western bloc is positive and significant at the 1% level in all the regressions, 
except regression where the dependent variable is political stability. At this level, the 
assumptions of using this cold war variable as institutional variables seem interesting.  
However, we cannot conclude with any strong results at this level. We now turn to the 
performance of the other determinants of institutional quality when control variables capital is 
accounted for in Table 2.We introduce progressively the variables in table 2. Surprisingly, the 
idea that richer countries are able to deliver institutions of higher quality is not statistically 
significant, although the expected sign is there. A better schooled population appears to be 
linked with institutions of better quality. The variable representing average years of schooling 
is positive and statistically significant higher in all the specifications. This is consistent with 
the previous empirical work by Glaeser et al. (2004) and other researchers and thus with the 
idea that better schooled population are able to improve institutions of higher quality. At 
home Alonso and Garcimartín, (2013), "historical" features either they do not seem to 
determine institutional quality or their effects are indirect, through the variables previously 
mentioned. Thus, according to our results, variables such as colonial origin do not have any 
impact on institutions. So general, in regional of sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, the 
institutions are poor quality. This is more significant for Latin America. 
Regarding our key variables of interest, the Eastern bloc proxy is negative and statistically 
significant at five per cent or higher. That is, countries with in the Eastern bloc proxy appear 
to have lower quality of institutions. The results are also consistent with the theoretical 
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literature discussed in section II. The western bloc continues to display the expected sign. 
That is, the positive effect on institutions. However, this information is no longer statistically 
significant. This relevance seems to be found in the effect of this variable on corruption, 
although it is not consistent. Nonetheless, once introduced, the variable pertaining to the 
identity of the coloniser loses its statistical significance. Belonging to the non-aligned 
countries brings no anything to the institutions. The only significant interrelationship that 
exists is that between the non-aligned countries and political stability.  
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Table 2. Regression with additional variables 
 Dependant variable 
 Government 
Effectiveness 
Political 
Stability 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Control of 
Corruption 
Rule of Law Property rights  
 
Eastern block -1.279 
(0.000) 
-1.147 
(0.000) 
-.61797 
(0.003) 
-.507 
(0.091) 
-.847 
(0.000) 
-.859 
(0.000) 
-1.361 
(0.000) 
-1.124   
(0.000) 
-.599 
(0.007) 
-.624 
(0.024) 
-1.471 
(0.000) 
-1.181 
(0.001) 
-2.121 
(0.000) 
-1.589 
(0.004) 
Western block .216 
(0.153) 
.203 
(0.418) 
.004 
(0.984) 
.387 
(0.552) 
.293 
(0.051) 
.135 
(0.600) 
.262 
(0.105) 
.173 
(0.597) 
.573 
(0.000) 
.404 
(0.114) 
.358 
(0.120) 
.344 
(0.385) 
.381 
(0.194) 
.569 
(0.418) 
Neutral block -.238 
(0.114) 
-.230 
(0.215) 
-.510 
(0.004) 
-.474 
(0.032) 
-.217 
(0.217) 
-.1604 
(0.466) 
-.206 
(0.177) 
-.236 
(0.198) 
-.332 
(0.061) 
-.291 
(0.118) 
-.266 
(0.158) 
-.301 
(0.181) 
-.335 
(0.235) 
-.396 
(0.224) 
School .244 
(0.000) 
.226 
(0.000) 
.201 
(0.000) 
.193 
(0.000) 
.224 
(0.000) 
.226 
(0.000) 
.241 
(0.000) 
.216   
(0.000) 
.222 
(0.000) 
.2049 
(0.000) 
.255 
(0.000) 
.223 
(0.000) 
.372 
(0.000) 
.297 
(0.000) 
GDP per capita 
(log) 
.001 
(0.300) 
001 
(0.429) 
.002 
(0.192) 
.003 
(0.124) 
.001 
(0.442) 
.001 
(0.512) 
.001 
(0.332) 
.001 
(0.495) 
.001 
(0.581) 
.001 
(0.731) 
.001 
(0.400) 
.001 
(0.724) 
.002 
(0.422) 
.001 
(0.623) 
Sub-saharianafrica -.256 
(0.106) 
-.303 
(0.099) 
.488 
(0.025) 
.319 
(0.171) 
-.152 
(0.414) 
-.212 
(0.298) 
-.181 
(0.283) 
-.229 
(0.234) 
.464 
(0.026) 
.454 
(0.041) 
-.006 
(0.972) 
-.048 
(0.804) 
-.158 
(0.600) 
-.3383 
(0.301) 
Latin america -.637 
(0.000) 
-.697 
(0.001) 
-.175 
(0.267) 
-.304 
(0.367) 
-.401 
(0.011) 
-.509 
(0.024) 
-.795 
(0.000) 
-.875   
(0.000) 
.338 
(0.011) 
.245 
(0.160) 
-.547 
(0.001) 
-.705 
(0.011) 
-1.101 
(0.000) 
-1.145 
(0.010) 
SpanishColony  .101 
(0.687) 
 -.120 
(0.767) 
 .072 
(0.787) 
 .136 
(0.578) 
 .356 
(0.179) 
 .277 
(0.320) 
 --- 
British Colony  .053 
(0.799) 
 -.186 
(0.470) 
 -.0426 
(0.854) 
 .115 
(0.585) 
 .225 
(0.387) 
 .152 
(0.464) 
 .095 
(0.835) 
OtherColony  -.006 
(0.979) 
 -.256 
(0.422) 
 .0280 
(0.889) 
 -.0666 
(0.764) 
 .406 
(0.141) 
 -.076 
(0.767) 
 -.280 
(0.584) 
French Colony  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  -.112 
(0.823) 
Cons  -1.188    
(0.000) 
  -1.089  
(0.005)    
-1.294    
(0.000) 
-1.038 
(0.014) 
-1.165 
(0.002) 
-1.1599 
(0.015) 
-1.278 
(0.000) 
-1.120    
(0.004) 
-1.491 
(0.000) 
-1.615 
(0.001) 
-1.406 
(0.000) 
-1.223 
(0.004) 
3.347 
(0.000) 
3.951 
(0.000) 
Obs 121 
 
99 121 99 121 99 121 99 121 99 121 100 101 80 
R-squared 0.7310 0.6699 0.4742 0.6959 0.6340 
 
0.5801 0.7038 
 
0.6427 0.5733 0.5170 0.6486 0.5946 0.6894 
 
0.6170 
--- dropped variable for collinearity ; All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. P-values are in parentheses. 
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The table 3 considers the dynamic of the cold war. The geopolitical configuration of the early 
50s continually evolved, especially with the coming of independence in the 60s and those 
which came at a later stage. At that period, the two major players (Varsovie bloc and Western 
bloc) went out to enrol as many associate countries. This deployment benefited the USA and 
also its traditional associate countries more, than countries of the Eastern bloc. More 
precisely, in the framework of this study, this is translated by a higher number of countries in 
the Western bloc’s variables, and a fall in the variable s of the non-aligned countries bloc. 
Table 3. Dynamics of cold war 
 Dependant variable 
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Political 
Stability 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Control of 
Corruption 
Rule of 
Law 
Property 
rights 
Eastern bloc  -.654 
(0.005) 
-.162 
(0.576) 
-.560 
(0.010) 
-.330 
(0.212) 
-.633 
(0.009) 
-.623 
(0.010) 
-.998 
(0.016) 
Western bloc  .201 
(0.135) 
.023 
(0.919) 
.049 
(0.716) 
.1021 
(0.506) 
.277 
(0.082) 
.181 
(0.224) 
.339 
(0.207) 
Neutral bloc -.074 
(0.773) 
-.019 
(0.953) 
-.164 
(0.515) 
.0393 
(0.885) 
-.188 
(0.596) 
-.022 
(0.934) 
.067 
(0.884) 
School .222 
(0.000) 
.206 
(0.000) 
.220 
(0.000) 
.224 
(0.000) 
.219 
(0.000) 
.2144 
(0.000) 
.321   
(0.000) 
GDP per capita 
(log) 
.001 
(0.445) 
.003 
(0.080) 
.001 
(0.632) 
.001 
(0.619) 
.001 
(0.717) 
.001 
(0.493) 
.001 
(0.717) 
Sub-saharianafrica -.347 
(0.067) 
.214 
(0.447) 
-.249 
(0.185) 
.415 
(0.048) 
-.174 
(0.403) 
-.253 
(0.206) 
-.358 
(0.286) 
Latin america -.986 
(0.000) 
-.401 
(0.260) 
-.721 
(0.003) 
.037 
(0.869) 
-1.113 
(0.000) 
-1.127 
(0.000) 
-1.619 
(0.003) 
SpanishColony .189 
(0.564) 
-.065 
(0.881) 
.141 
(0.641) 
.451 
(0.146) 
.413 
(0.206) 
.2167 
(0.473) 
--- 
British Colony -.031 
(0.881) 
-.203 
(0.493) 
-.122 
(0.574) 
.150 
(0.580) 
.083 
(0.692) 
.034 
(0.870) 
-.2295 
(0.665) 
OtherColony -.204 
(0.332) 
-.284 
(0.354) 
-.134 
(0.494) 
.319 
(0.253) 
-.268 
(0.274) 
-.2608 
(0.221) 
-.691 
(0.282) 
French Colony --- --- --- --- --- --- -.174 
(0.788) 
Cons  -1.168 
(0.000) 
-1.439 
(0.001) 
-1.100 
(0.001) 
-1.901 
(0.000) 
-1.333   
(0.000) 
-1.235 
(0.000) 
3.744   
(0.000) 
Obs 99 99 99 99 99 99 80 
R-squared 0.6265 0.3403 0.5553 0.4682 0.5419 0.5972 0.5813 
--- dropped variable for collinearity ; All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. P-values 
are in parentheses. 
This reconfiguration of our variables permits us to better test the third hypothesis. This 
hypothesis seems sustainable. Certain instability is observed in the bloc belonging to the non-
aligned countries. This is manifested by the change of the signs that we observe in certain 
specifications. The coefficient of the Western bloc is similar to the later. If this outreach 
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permitted the Western bloc to enrol more countries, it is with the “Varsovie bloc” that this 
outreach fundamentally changed the plan. As a result no significance is noticed for certain 
variables. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we investigated the determinants of institutional quality. More precisely, we test 
the hypothesis that the Cold war is fundamental to the current state of institutions. Our 
empirical research suggests that the quality of institutions depends essentially on cold war and 
education. 
The significance of this study consists of using the geopolitics of the cold war as an important 
variable. Our empirical results attest that countries belonging to the Eastern bloc have 
institutions of weak quality compared to those of the Western bloc and the non-aligned 
countries. as such, this research is a contribution to the determinants of institutions, but also to 
the recent studies in political economics which attempts to understand the consequences of 
the cold war. Finally this study suggests a new instrument to resolve the problem of 
endogeneity of variables, notably that of institutional variables. 
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